Helmut Schmidt’s Nuclear Ambitions: A Cautionary Tale

In 2023, Germany completed the phasing out of its nuclear program, a process that took decades but was far from a foregone conclusion. From 1973 to 1986, a fierce public opinion battle raged over Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s nuclear energy ambitions. Schmidt, a technocrat at his core, viewed the debate as one of science and expertise versus feelings and fearmongering. He made scientifically grounded arguments that nuclear energy could provide for West Germany’s energy needs, but ultimately Schmidt came up short in the debate. 

On April 24, 1975, Schmidt called a special meeting with the leaders of West Germany’s nine federal states. He planned to devote more than 6.4 billion Deutsche Marks to build the largest nuclear energy program in West German history. The investment represented Schmidt’s response to the 1973 OPEC oil crisis, which had caught Bonn completely off guard. 

When the time came to break ground on the first reactor, Schmidt’s efforts were met not with applause but instead by tens of thousands of protestors who demanded that West Germany turn away from nuclear energy. Despite the opposition, Schmidt was determined to see his national nuclear energy program succeed. He declared that with the state minister’s help, West Germany would build a national nuclear energy program built off a coalition of “industry, science, and the administration.”[1] In one of his many speeches advocating for nuclear energy, Schmidt downplayed anti-nuclear arguments and declared, “We don't need any scaremongering. We are grown up enough to face up to the real necessities without scaremongering. Fear-mongering can obscure our view of the necessary solutions…. We need engineers in politics!”[2]        

Schmidt mobilized the federal government to launch a decade-long media relations campaign called the Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy (Bürgerdialog Kernenergie). The campaign spent tens of millions of Deutsche Marks and published hundreds of thousands of booklets, pamphlets, and letters that were sent to civilians curious about this new form of energy. Schmidt’s federal government also conducted extensive surveys through the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (Institut für angwandte Sozialwissenschaft, or INFAS).[3] These surveys were crucial for Schmidt and his allies and indicated that in 1976 the majority of German citizens felt more positive about nuclear energy than negative – but also that 40-percent of voters had not yet formulated an opinion.[4]

As the campaign developed, Schmidt’s government tried to creatively undermine anti-nuclear arguments, such as publishing satirical magazines mocking fears some citizens had about nuclear energy. Despite all the funds and coordinated efforts to convince the public of the benefits of nuclear energy, Schmidt still met strong resistance.

An unorthodox coalition of pacifists, environmentalists, socialists, and many other groups, wary of Schmidt’s nuclear energy program, slowly turned public opinion against nuclear energy. They deemphasized the science and technology of nuclear energy and instead embraced emotions and how one should feel about nuclear energy and the risk of something going wrong. Protestors also weaponized Germany’s history, calling Schmidt and pro-nuclear supporters “Nuclear Fascists” for their use of the federal police and the army to maintain order at protests, something they argued was unconstitutional.  Schmidt’s opponents contended that if West Germany embraced nuclear energy, they would create an “Atomic State” that would erode a transparent democratic society due to the national security apparatus needed to protect state secrets for energy needs.[5] 

Many anti-nuclear arguments amplified fears of reactor meltdowns and political consequences. While the debate was happening in West Germany, it also raged on the international stage, as the accident at Three Mile Island in the United States in March 1979 appeared to validate the anti-nuclear protestors’ emphasis on the risks of nuclear power. 

Schmidt repeatedly underestimated the power of the anti-nuclear activists emotionally charged rhetoric and ultimately failed to build long-term support among West German voters for his nuclear energy program. When Schmidt was voted out of office in 1982, West Germany received more than 30-percent of its energy needs from nuclear energy, but long-term confidence in this program was shattered when news of the reactor meltdown in Chernobyl in 1986 spread across the world. The German Greens appeared prophetic in their predictions of what could happen with nuclear energy. When Germany shut down its final reactor on April 15, 2023, it was not met with protests but with applause by German voters. Yet, this path was not inevitable.

The nuclear energy debate during Helmut Schmidt’s chancellorship reveals the difficulties that liberal democracies face in trusting and promoting experts’ opinions and communicating these ideas. Simply put, the question of nuclear energy and its safety was a complex one and Schmidt, rather than seeking to understand people’s concerns, simply told them what the government would do. 

This is a cautionary tale. Governments eager to create large scale programs cannot rely on expertise alone. They must educate the public and find ways to connect with them. Particularly with the rise of scientific skepticism, building public support in long-term energy and environmentally sustainable policies is just as important as the content that experts seek to share.

[1] BArch, 136, 10869, “Auszuge aus der Aufzeichnung ueber die Besprechung des Bundeskanzlers  mit den Reigerunschefs der Laender am 24. April 1975.”, April 24,1975, 1.

[2] BKHS, Helmut Schmidt,“Ansprache von Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt” Verein Deutscher Ingenieure Nachrichten), HSA EA111, July 4, 1975, 25.

[3] BArch, 136, 10903 “Die Toleranzen der Bundesbevölkerung gegenuber dem Bau von kernkraftwerken - January/February 1976”, 460.

[4] BArch, 136, 10903 “Die Toleranzen der Bundesbevölkerung gegenuber dem Bau von kernkraftwerken - January/February 1976”, 460.

[5] Christian Schütze, “Kernkraft spaltet den Rechtsstaat” [“Nuclear Power Splits the Constitutional State”], Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 3, 1976.